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Sammendrag 
Nylige deskriptive studier tyder at typen høyere utdanning (fagfelt eller institusjon) gir et viktig, men 
lite studert bidrag til utdannings-homogene ekteskap. Disse beskrivende studiene reiser spørsmålet 
om hvorfor høyt utdannede i så stor grad gifter seg med noen fra sin egen institusjon eller sitt fagfelt. 
En mulig forklaring er at personer velger partnere basert på kjennetegn som er korrelert med valg av 
utdanning, for eksempel medfødt evne, smak eller familie- og oppvekstmiljø. En annen mulig 
forklaring er at valget av høyere utdanning kausalt påvirker om og med hvem man gifter seg, enten på 
grunn av søkefriksjoner eller preferanser for ektefellens utdanning. I denne artikkelen bruker vi 
norske data for å løse viktige identifikasjons- og måleutfordringer, slik at vi kan studere disse 
hypotesene og dermed undersøke universiteter og høyskolers rolle som ekteskapsmarkeder. Vi finner 
at høyere utdanningsinstitusjoner er lokale ekteskapsmarkeder, som har stor betydning for hvem man 
gifter seg med. Ikke på grunn av de forhåndsbestemte egenskapene til studentene, men som et direkte 
resultat av å gå på en bestemt institusjon på et gitt tidspunkt. 
1 Introduction
Assortative mating, or who marries whom, fundamentally shapes our society, as it de-
termines the joint attributes of married couples. Although education is one of the traits
most intensively studied in the assortative mating literature, college graduates are com-
monly treated as a homogeneous group.1 An emerging body of descriptive work, how-
ever, points to the possibility that the type of college education (field or institution) is
an important but neglected pathway through which individuals sort into homogeneous
marriages. For example, Eika et al. (2019) use Norwegian data to show that while col-
lege graduates as a whole were about twice as likely to be married to one another com-
pared to the counterfactual situation where college educated were randomly matched,
law graduates are nearly 30 times as likely to be married to one another.2 Furthermore,
Nielsen and Svarer (2009) show that around 20 percent of Danish couples attended the
same educational institution.
These descriptive studies raise the question of why college graduates are so likely to
marry someone within their own institution or field of study. Several explanations are
possible. One is a pure selection story; individuals may match on traits correlated with
choice of college field or institution. These traits may be unobserved to the analyst,
such as innate ability, tastes or family environment. Another story is one of causa-
tion, where the choice of college education causally impacts whether and whom one
marries. A causal link can operate through a number of channels, including search fric-
tions or preferences for spousal education.3 Sorting out these explanations is central
both to gauge the socio-economic consequences of college education and to understand
how education policy and college admission criteria may influence the outcomes in the
marriage market. Furthermore, evidence that individuals match with the same educa-
tion types primarily because of search frictions as opposed to preferences would suggest
that marriage markets are much more local than typically modeled or described by
economists.
The goal of this paper is to sort out these explanations and, by doing so, examine
the role of colleges as marriage markets. The context of our study is Norway’s post-
secondary education system. Our work draws on two strengths of this environment.
First, Norwegian register data allow us to observe not only people’s choice of college
education (institution and field) and workplace, but also if and who they marry (or
cohabit with). Second, a centralized admission process creates instruments for choice
1See literature reviews in Blossfeld (2009), Han and Qian (2020), and Eika et al. (2019).
2See also Bičáková and Jurajda (2016) and Han and Qian (2020), who show strong assortative mating
by post-secondary field of study in various OECD countries and in the US, respectively.
3Both theory and evidence suggest marriage decisions are increasingly driven by returns to matching
on similarities (e.g. due to leisure complementarities), rather than potential gains from trade (see the
review in Juhn and McCue, 2017).
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of college eduction from discontinuities that effectively randomize applicants near un-
predictable admission cutoffs into different institutions and fields of study.4 Thus, dif-
ferences in marriage market outcomes across these applicants are due to the institution
or field to which they are exogenously assigned, as opposed to their pre-existing traits.
Our instrumental variables estimates are summarized with six broad conclusions.
First, the type of post-secondary education is empirically important in explainingwhom
but not whether one marries. Indeed, the magnitude of the effects of enrollment on ho-
mogamy are sufficiently large to explain amajority of the strong educational homogamy
and assortativity that we observe among the college educated in our data. Second, en-
rolling in a particular institution makes it much more likely to marry someone from
that institution. These effects are especially large if individuals overlapped in college,
are sizable even for those who studied a different field and are not driven by geography.
Third, enrolling in a particular field increases the chances of marrying someone within
the field but only insofar the individuals attended the same institution. Enrolling in a
field makes it no more likely to marry someone from other institutions with the same
field. Fourth, the effects of enrollment on educational homogamy and assortativity vary
systematically across fields and institutions, and tend to larger in more selective and
higher paying fields and institutions. Fifth, only a small part of the effect of enrollment
on educational homogamy can be attributed to matches within the same workplace.
Lastly, the effects on the probability of marrying someone within their institution and
field vary systematically with cohort-to-cohort variation in sex ratios within institutions
and fields. As discussed in greater detail later, this finding is at odds with the assumption
in canonical matching models of large and frictionless marriage markets.5
Taken together, our findings suggests that colleges are effectively local marriage mar-
kets, mattering greatly for the whom one marries, not because of the pre-determined
traits of the students that are admitted but as a direct result of attending a particular
institution at a given time. These findings contribute to a growing literature that doc-
uments educational homogamy and assortativity and tries to understand their causes
and consequences. The closest studies to our work are concerned with drawing causal
inference about how the choice of post-secondary education affects the quality of an
individual’s spouse. Kaufmann et al. (2013) study admission to elite higher education
institutions in Chile. Applying a regression discontinuity design to the admission sys-
tem, they find that attending a higher ranked university has a sizable effect on the quality
of an individual’s spouse. Artmann et al. (2018) use admission lotteries for four over-
4Kirkeboen et al. (2016) use these discontinuities to show that earnings payoffs vary a lot by post-
secondary field of study and less by institution. The results highlight the limitations of treating college
educated as a homogeneous group.
5Chiappori (2020) reviews theory and empirics of the marriage market, discussing both frictionless
matching models and search models with frictions.
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subscribed programs in the Netherlands, and find that field of study matters for partner
choice. Neither of these studies document how and why the choices of post-secondary
education affect educational homogamy and assortativity.
A related body of work seeks to quantify the importance of search frictions and
meeting opportunities for assortative mating. One of these is Nielsen and Svarer (2009),
who use Danish data to document the extent to which individuals match on education
length and type.6 They find that around half of the systematic sorting on education
can be attributed to the tendency of individuals to marry someone who went to the
same educational institution or to an institution nearby. Nielsen and Svarer conclude
that this may be due to search frictions or selection of people with the same preferences
into the same institution. To address this identification challenge, a few studies have
taken advantage of detailed data from the dating market. Hitsch et al. (2010) find that
search frictions may play an important role in explaining the observed matching pat-
tern by education at an online dating site. Belot and Francesconi (2013) use data from
a speed dating agency to identify the role of opportunities separately from that of pref-
erences. Their findings suggest the role of individual preferences is outplayed by that of
opportunities.
We complement the existing work in several way. First, we show that the choices
of post-secondary education are empirically important in explaining whom but not
whether onemarries while addressing concerns about self-selection into education based
on unobservables. Second, the admission system we study creates exogenous variation
in both field and institution choice, which allows us to disentangle the relative impor-
tance of institution and field of study. Third, because we can follow individuals through
the education system and into the labor market, we can jointly examine the choice of
education and workplace for educational homogamy. Lastly, given our detailed and
large population panel data, we are able to estimate market-specific matching functions
that helps investigate the impact of local market tightness and size on educational ho-
mogamy.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describe the secondary
education sector in Norway and its admission process. Section 3 presents the data and
sample restrictions. Section 4 defines and describes educational homogamy and assor-
tativity among high educated in Norway. Section 5 provides a graphical depiction of
the relevance and validity of our research design, while Section 6 turns to the formal
6See also Mansour and McKinnish (2014), who use survey data from the US to document that same-
occupationmatching is strongly related to the sex composition of the occupation. To distinguish between
a preferences explanation and a search cost explanation, they investigate whether women accept lower-
wage husbands if they match within-occupation compared to if they do not, and how this wage gap varies
with the sex composition of the occupation.
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econometric model. Section 7 presents our main findings on how the choices of post-
secondary institution and field affect educational homogamy and assortativity, while
Section 8 examines the ways in which this educational homogamy and assortativity
arise. The final section concludes.
2 Institutions, admission process, and identification strategy
In this section, we describe the secondary education sector in Norway and its admission
process, laying the groundwork for what we do in the empirical analysis.
2.1 Post-secondary education sector
During the period we study, the Norwegian post-secondary education sector consisted
of a handful of public universities and a number of public and private university col-
leges. The vast majority of students attend a public institution, and even the private
institutions are funded and regulated by the Ministry of Education and Research. A
post-secondary degree normally lasts 3–5 years. The universities all offer awide selection
of fields. By comparison, the university colleges rarely offer fields like Law, Medicine,
Science, or Technology, but tend to offer professional degrees in fields like Engineering,
Health, Business, and Teaching. There are generally no tuition fees for attending post-
secondary education in Norway, and most students are eligible for financial support
(part loan/part grant) from the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund.
The main universities are located in the major city of each of the five regions: Bergen
and Stavanger (West), Oslo (East), Kristiansand (South), Trondheim (Central) and
Tromsø (North). In addition, there are a few other universities and several university
colleges spread across the country. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the post sec-
ondary student population across Norwegian municipalities in the years 1998–2004.7
As can be seen in the Figure, in most (393 of the 422) municipalities there are no col-
leges or universities and, thus, few if any students. The large majority of students (about
60 percent) live inOslo, Bergen or Trondheim, the three biggest cities ofNorway. There
is also a sizable student population in a few other municipalities, such as Tromsø, Kris-
tiansand and Stavanger.
7There are generally long driving distances between (populated areas of) the different local labor mar-
kets, which are mostly far apart or partitioned by mountains or the fjord-broken shoreline. Thus, stu-
dents attending a given university/university college typically live in the same commuting zone. Most









Figure 1. Higher education enrollment
2.2 Admission process
The admission process to post-secondary education is centralized. Individuals submit
their application to a single organization, the Norwegian Universities and Colleges Ad-
mission Service, which handles the admission process to all universities and most uni-
versity colleges. The unit in the application process (program) is the combination of
field and institution (e.g. Teaching at the University of Oslo).
Every year in the late fall, the Ministry of Education and Research decides on fund-
ing to each field at every institution, which effectively determines the supply of slots.
While some slots in some programs are reserved for special quotas (e.g. students from
northernmost part of Norway), the bulk of the slots are for the main pool of appli-
cants. For many programs, demand exceeds supply. Programs for which there is excess
demand are filled based on an application score derived from high school GPA. Indi-
vidual course grades at high school range from 1 to 6 (only integer values), and GPA is
calculated as 10 times the average grade (up to two decimal places). A few extra points
on the application score are awarded for choosing specific subjects in high school. For
some programs, the application score can also be adjusted based on ad-hoc field spe-
cific conditions unrelated to academic requirements (e.g. two extra points for women
at some male-dominated fields). Additionally, applicants can get some compensation
in their application score depending on their age, previous education and fulfillment of
military service.
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On applying, applicants rank up to fifteen programs. Information about what fields
are offered by the different institutions is made available in a booklet that is distributed
at high schools. The deadline for applying to programs is mid-April. This is the appli-
cants’ first submission of program rankings. They can adjust their rankings until July.
New programs cannot be added, but programs can be dropped from the ranking. Once
the rankings are final in July, offers aremade according to a sequential dictatorshipmech-
anism where the order is determined by the applicants’ application score: the highest
ranked applicant receives an offer for her preferred program; the second highest appli-
cant receives an offer for her highest ranked program among the remaining programs;
and so on. This is repeated until either slots run out, or applicants run out.
This procedure generates a first set of offers which are sent out to the applicants in
late July. Applicants then have a week to accept the offer, if they get one. Irrespective
of whether they accept applicants can, choose to remain on a waiting list for preferred
program options, or withdraw from the application process. The slots that remain after
the first round are then allocated in a second round of offers in early August among
the remaining applicants on the waiting list. These new offers are generated following
the same sequential dictatorship mechanism as in the first round. Since applicants in
this second round can only move up in the offer sequence, second round offers will
either correspond to first round offers, or be an offer for a higher ranked program. By
choosing to remain on a waiting list the applicants accept that their first round offer
is automatically discarded if they get a higher-ranked offer in the second round. In
mid-August, the applicants begin their study in the accepted field and institution. If
students want to change field or institution, they usually need to participate in next
year’s admission process on equal terms with other applicants.
2.3 Admission thresholds and identification strategy
As described above, the admission process to post-secondary education generates a setup
where applicants scoring above a certain threshold are much more likely to receive an
offer for a program they prefer as compared to applicants with the same program pref-
erences but marginally lower application score. As illustrated in Table 1, this process
creates discontinuities which effectively randomize applicants near unpredictable admis-
sion cutoffs into different programs, fields and institutions.
We first consider how to use these discontinuities to identify the impact of choosing
one type of program as compared to another. To this end, panel (a) of Table 1 is suf-
ficient. This panel presents an example of an application where the applicant is on the
margin of getting different field offers from the same institution. Suppose the applicant
has an application score of 49. In this case, she would receive an offer for her 3rd ranked
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Table 1. Illustration of comparisons used to identify threshold crossing effects of pro-
grams, fields and institutions
(a) Fields
Program Ranking Inst. Field Cutoff
1st best A 1 57
2nd best B 1 52
3rd best A 2 48
4th best A 3 45
Application score = 49
Local Ranking Inst. Field Offer
Preferred A 2 Yes
Next-best A 3 No
Application score = 47
Local Ranking Inst. Field Offer
Preferred A 2 No
Next-best A 3 Yes
(b) Institutions
Program Ranking Inst. Field Cutoff
1st best B 1 52
2nd best A 2 48
3rd best B 2 46
4th best B 3 43
Application score = 49
Local Ranking Inst. Field Offer
Preferred A 2 Yes
Next-best B 2 No
Application score = 47
Local Ranking Inst. Field Offer
Preferred A 2 No
Next-best B 2 Yes
program. This defines her preferred program in the local program ranking around her
application score, namely the program consisting of field 2 at institution A.We can now
compare her to an applicant with the same ranking of programs, but who has a slightly
lower application score of 47. This applicant has the same programs in the local ranking
around her application score. However, because of the marginally lower score, she does
not receive an offer of the preferred program, field 2 at institution A.
By comparing the outcomes of applicants like these – with the same preferred pro-
gram and application scores just below and above the program’s admission cutoff – we
can estimate the effect of crossing the admission threshold to the preferred program. As
long as individuals are not able to perfectly sort around the cutoffs, we can rule out that
differences in their outcomes are driven by unobserved heterogeneity in preferences,
ability and other confounders. In Section 4, we will report such threshold crossing ef-
fects for a wide range of outcomes. Next, we will, in Section 5, use threshold crossing
as an instrument for enrollment in a particular program. This instrumental variables
approach allows us to draw inferences about how the choice of college education affects
whether and whom one marries.
It is important to observe that the admission process creates exogenous variation in
not only programs but also fields and institutions. This allows us to quantify the relative
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importance of field versus institution of study for marriage and educational homogamy.
To see this, it is useful to consider both panels of Table 1. In panel (a), the two applicants
are on the margin of getting an offer for the same field but from different institutions.
One applicant has a application score of 49 and, therefore, receives an offer from her
preferred field in the local field ranking around her application score, namely field 2. The
other applicant has the same ranking of fields and institutions, but is not offered field 2
because she has a slightly lower application score of 47. By comparing the outcomes of
these applicants we can estimate the effect of getting an offer from the preferred field 2.
Panel (b) gives another example where two applicants are on the margin of getting an
offer for the same field but from different institutions. One applicant has a application
score of 49. Thus, she receives an offer from institution A, her preferred institution in the
local institution ranking around her application score. The other applicant has the same
ranking of institution, but is not offered institution A because she has a slightly lower
application score of 47. By comparing the outcomes of these applicants we can estimate
the effect of getting an offer from the preferred institution. In addition to estimating the
causal effects of being offered particular fields or institutions, we can also use threshold
crossing indicators as instruments to infer the consequences of enrolling in these fields
or institutions.
Finally note that applicants can be on two margins. For example, the applicant with
a score of 49 in (a) can be on the margin between (B, 1) and (A, 2) or between (A, 2)
and (A, 3). In our analysis below we use both margins. However, only about 15–20
percent of applicants are observed on two margins, and our estimates do not materially
change if we exclude these applicants (see robustness analyses in Section 7).
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data sources, sample selection, and definition of key variables
Our analysis employs several data sources fromNorway thatwe can link through unique
identifiers for each individual, spouse and parent. We start with the application records
from the Norwegian Universities and Colleges Admission Service. These records give
information on nearly all applications to post-secondary education in Norway for the
years 1998 to 2004. We select the application cohorts 1998–2004, where 1998 is the
first cohort for which data is available. Stopping at 2004 allows us to study marriages
and cohabitation in a balanced panel formed within 13 years after application.8 We
retain the individuals’ first observed application, also requiring that they – at the time of
8The panel is nearly perfectly balanced. Only a small number of individuals (about 2 percent) drop
out at some point during the 13 year period mainly due to emigration.
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application – have no post-secondary degree, are younger than 27 years, and are neither
married nor cohabiting. We also drop applicants who have an application score further
than 2 standard deviations away from the threshold, and who have missing information
on completed education 13 years after applying.
The application records provide information for each applicant on his or her ranking
of programs, application scores, offers received and enrollment decisions. In addition,
we observe the admission cutoffs (if any) for each program in every year. We merge
these records with administrative registers provided by Statistics Norway that cover
every resident from 1967 to 2017. For each year, it contains individual socioeconomic
information (including sex, age, marital and cohabiting status, educational attainment,
and earnings). Following Norwegian official statistics, we define amatch as a man and a
woman who are living at the same address and are either married or cohabitants, or have
a child together. The data allow us to construct measures of the educational attainment,
earnings and socio-economic background of both the applicants and their partners (if
any).
The information on educational attainment includes both the completed field and
the institution from which individuals graduate. The background variables are based
on information about parental education (both for the mother and father), income of
the father, and the immigrant status of the family. This information is pre-determined
in the context of our analysis, and refers to the year when the applicant was 16 (fathers’
earnings are averages at ages 16 and 19).
In our main analysis, we consider an estimation sample of 110,345 applicants who
apply for at least two programs, where the most preferred program needs to have an
admission cutoff, and the next-best alternative must have a lower cutoff (or no binding
cutoff). This ensures that we have information on the preferred program, and a source
of identification (potentially binding admission cutoffs) in our analysis. In the analysis
of field and institution of study, we construct estimation samples in a similar fashion.
To construct measures of assortativity, we also need to take a stand of the population
of potential partners. About 70 percent of all applicants in our sample are 19–21 years
in the application year. We therefore approximate the population of potential partners
by other college graduates who were also aged 19–21 in the year of application. Empir-
ically, the results are highly robust to the exact choice of this age range. The reason is
that measures of assortativity we use depend on the shares of same-sex and opposite-sex
graduates with the same education which vary relatively little from cohort to cohort in
our sample period.
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Table 2. Summary statistics of applications: Rankings and offers
Sample Mean St. Deviation
Rankings
# Programs ranked 6.8 4.1
# Fields ranked 3.5 2.1
# Institutions ranked 4.0 2.7
Offers
Rank of best offer 2.6 2.5
Offered 1st rank 0.47
Offered 2nd rank 0.24
Offered 3rd rank 0.12
No offer 0.10
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the main estimation sample, consisting of 110,345 appli-
cants.
3.2 Summary statistics of applicants
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the applications of our estimation sample. These
applicants listed, on average, about 7 programs, across 3–4 different fields and institu-
tions. While a substantial fraction is offered their first ranked program, the average offer
is for the 3rd ranked program. 10 percent are not offered any program.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for key characteristics and outcomes of our esti-
mation sample. The majority of applicants, about 62 percent, is female. The applicants
are, on average, between 20 and 21 years old when we observe them applying for the
first time.9 About 50 percent of the applicants has a high-educated mother or father.
Only 4 percent of the applicants are immigrants. Table 3 shows that 77 percent of the
applicants enroll in some higher education in the application year, 36 percent enroll in
their preferred field and 42 in their preferred institution, and 33 percent enroll in their
preferred program (i.e., combination of field and program). Within 13 years after ap-
plying, 97 precent of applicants have enrolled in some higher education, 44 percent in
their preferred program at the time of application, and about 55 percent in their pre-
ferred field or institution. Examining the probability of matching within 13 years after
applying, we find that 80 percent of the applicants are matched with a spouse or partner
while 50 percent have a college-educated spouse. As shown in Appendix Figure A1,
these marriage patterns are fairly similar across cohorts.
9In Norway, students graduate from high school in the year they turn 19, after which many serve in
the military, travel, or work for a year or two before enrolling in post-secondary education.
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- College educated parents 0.50
- Application score 49.0
Application year Within 13 years
Enrollment in:
- Any college 0.77 0.97
- Preferred program 0.33 0.44
- Preferred field 0.36 0.55
- Preferred institution 0.42 0.56
Marriage:
- Any spouse 0.80
- College-educated spouse 0.50
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the main estimation sample, consisting of 110,345 appli-
cants.
4 Educational homogamy and assortativity
In Table 4, we dig deeper into the matching patterns in the estimation sample. The
first column reports educational homogamy rates, as measured by the share of the ap-
plicants whose first observed match is to someone with the same type (program, field
or institution) of college education. The program homogamy rate is about 4.6 percent.
By comparison, 6.2 percent are homogamous with respect to field. This means that 1
out of 8 of the college educated couples have degrees in the same field. The institution
homogamy rate is as large as 12 percent, which means that both spouses have graduated
from the same institution in 1 out of 4 of the college educated couples.
The fact that the homogamy rate is largest at the level of the institution does not
necessarily imply that assortativity is stronger by institution as compared to field or
program. This is because homogamy not only depends on the degree of sorting but
also on the number of men and women with each type of education. Homogamy rates
could therefore be larger for institutions and fields than for programs even if people
would have been matched randomly. The second column of Table 4 confirms that this
is indeed the case in our data. If we randomly match applicants and partners with
potential partners, then the homogamy rate is close to zero for programs and around
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Table 4. Summary statistics: Educational homogamy and assortativity
Homogamy Assortativity
Observed Random Maximal Absolute Rescaled
ℎ ℎr ℎm ℎ − ℎr ℎ−ℎrℎm−ℎr
Homogamy:
– Program 0.046 0.002 0.545 0.044 0.082
– Field 0.062 0.013 0.578 0.049 0.087
– Institution 0.121 0.012 0.705 0.109 0.157
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the main estimation sample, consisting of 110,345 ap-
plicants. Observed homogamy is the share of applicants and partners with same completed program,
field or institution. Random homogamy is constructed as the share matched times the share of poten-
tial partners with the relevant type of education for each type of education, sex and application year.
Maximal homogamy is the share of students that could potentially be matched to an opposite-sex part-
ner with the same type of education in the population of potential partners. Rescaled assortativity is
constructed by rescaling average absolute assortativity with the average difference between maximal and
random homogamy.
1.5 percent for institutions and fields. This shows that individuals are much more likely
to match with someone from the same institution, field and program as compared to
what one would observe under random matching.
To quantify the amount of sorting, it is useful to supplement estimates of educa-
tional homogamy with measures of assortativity, which is regularly defined as a mating
pattern in which individuals with similar traits mate with one another more frequently
than would be expected under a random mating pattern. This definition suggests that
educational assortativity can be measured by comparing the observed homogamy rates
to those produced by random matching of men and women. In the fourth column of
Table 4, we compute this measure of assortativity for programs, fields and institutions.
The results show that applicants with the same type of education match much more fre-
quently than what would be expected under a marriage pattern that is random in terms
of education. This positive assortativity occurs for programs, fields and institutions.
However, the degree of assortativity is heterogeneous and varies depending on the mar-
gin of college education one considers. The applicants were 10 percentage points more
likely to be married to someone with a degree from the same institution compared to
random mating; for program or field, they were 4 and 5 percentage points more likely
to match than expected under random mating patterns.
When interpreting measures of educational assortativity it is important to observe
that the values they can take are constrained by the marginal distributions of education
among men and women. This is most easily illustrated with two types of education.
If men are women have equal distributions of education then perfect assortativity is
feasible (i.e., the homogamy rate can be one). If all men have education of one type
15
while all women have education of the other type, then assortativity is infeasible (i.e.,
the homogamy must be zero). We follow Liu and Lu (2006) and recenter homogamy






where ℎ is the observed homogamy rate, ℎr is the homogamy rate we would observe un-
der randommatching, and ℎm is the maximal attainable homogamy. Using this rescaled
measure the absence of assortativity corresponds to R = 0 , and the maximum positive
level of assortativity that is attainable given the distribution of education on the two
sides of the market is denoted by R = 1. For a given education E = e (program, field, or
institution), let s se denote the share of same-sex graduates and soe the share of opposite-sex
graduates. Then:
ℎre = s se × soe (2)
and
ℎme =
min(s se, soe )
s se
. (3)
The overall random and maximum homogamy rates (reported in columns 3 and 4 of
Table 4) follow from averaging ℎre and ℎme with education shares se ≡ Pr(E = e).
The final column in Table 4 reports the resulting rescaled homogamy rates. These
centered and rescaled measures show that assortativity is high at all education margins.
For programs and fields of study around 8 percent of maximum feasible assortativity is
realized, and this number is twice as high at 16 percent at the institution level.
5 The effects of threshold crossing
Before we analyze how the choice of college education affects whether and whom one
marries, it is useful to understandwhat does and does not change at the admission thresh-
olds. We start with documenting that there is no evidence of strategic sorting around the
thresholds and little if any impact of threshold crossing on the likelihood of enrolling
or ultimately completing college. What does change as a result of crossing the admis-
sion thresholds is the type of education that one enrolls in and completes, as well as
whom one marries. Threshold crossing does not, however, affect the overall likelihood
of matching.
To estimate the effect of threshold crossing we first standardize and center individu-
als’ application score at the threshold. We then estimate local-linear regressions on both
sides of the cutoff and use this to estimate the average treatment effect at the application
cutoff. We use the implementation of Calonico et al. (2014), a common MSE-optimal
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bandwidth selector and report the resulting estimate and bias-corrected confidence in-
terval (b-c CI) in the figures below. We also estimate OLS regressions with a linear
spline in the standardized application score and report the coefficient on the threshold
crossing dummy. The local-linear regression estimates support the parametric specifica-
tion of the linear-spline regressions, which deliver estimates that are always in line with
the non-parametric ones and also are more precise.
Assessing the validity of the regression-discontinuity design
A potential threat to the regression-discontinuity design that we are exploiting here is
that people might try to sort themselves above the cutoff in order to receive an offer
for their preferred field of study. If such sorting occurs we would expect to observe
discontinuities around the cutoffs in the density of applicants and in their observed
characteristics. We investigate this in turn.
Figure 2 pools all the fields and admission cutoffs. The data is normalized so that
zero on the x-axis represents the admission cutoff to the preferred field, and observations
to the left (right) of this cutoff have therefore an application score that is lower (higher)
than the cutoff. We plot the unrestricted means in bins and include regression lines on
each side of the admission cutoff. What matters for our research design is that there is
no discontinuous jump in probability mass at zero, since that would point to sorting.
As can be seen in Figure 2, there is no indication that applicants are able to strategi-
cally position themselves around the application boundary, and the test proposed by
McCrary (2008) is insignificant at conventional levels and, thus, we can not reject the
null hypothesis of no sorting.
A complementary approach to assess the validity of the research design is to investi-
gate covariate balance around the cutoffs. We consider several individual characteristics
that correlate with earnings: gender, cohort, application score, parental education and
immigrant status. We construct a composite index of these pre-determined characteris-
tics, namely predicted earnings, using the coefficients from an OLS regression of earn-
ings on these variables. Figure 2 shows average predicted earnings in small intervals on
both sides of the pooled application cutoffs and (global and local) linear regression lines.
There is no indication that applicants are materially different in terms of observables at
the application boundaries.
Taken together, the results in Figure 2 suggest that students do not sort themselves
around the admission cutoffs. The absence of sorting around the cutoffs is consistent
with key features of the admission process. First, the exact admission cutoffs are un-
known both when individuals do their high school exams and when they submit their
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local: 2.731 (1.822), b-c CI: [-1.535, 6.904]
Note: Panel (a) shows log density of applicants. Panel (b) shows an index of pre-determined charac-
teristics, constructed as predicted earnings. Estimates in notes are with global linear splines and local
linear regressions using a triangular kernel using Calonico et al. (2014). Standard errors in parentheses.
Bias-corrected confidence intervals from Calonico et al. (2014) in brackets. Graphs are constructed us-
ing the rdplot command from Calonico et al. (2014). Dots represent bin means, bins are selected with
the IMSE-optimal quantile-based method using polynomial regression. The lines represent fourth-degree
global splines.
Figure 2. Threshold crossing and sorting
of changes in demand, but also because changes in funding cause variation in the sup-
ply of slots. Third, there is limited scope for sorting around the cutoff during the last
semester of high school when students do their final exams and apply for post-secondary
education. In our setting, the application scores depend on the academic results over all
three years in high school, unlike countries in which admission is based only on how
well the students do in final year exams or college entrance tests.
Regression-discontinuity estimates on college enrollment and completion
Since students do not appear to sort around the admission thresholds, we can infer the
causal effects of threshold crossing by examining how the outcomes change around the
thresholds. As above, Figure 3 pools all the programs and admission cutoffs. For each
outcome, we plot the unrestricted means in bins and include regression lines on each
side of the admission cutoff.
The first two panels of Figure 3 show that having an application score above the
threshold increases the likelihood of both receiving an offer and enrolling in the year of
application. The next two panels show that threshold crossing to the preferred program
has negligible effects on being ever enrolled in college or completing college. Taken
together, these results suggest that threshold crossing only has a small impact on the
timing of college enrollment and, more importantly, it does not influence the chances
18







-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Distance from cutoff (SDs)
linear: 0.118 (0.003)**
local: 0.074 (0.007)**, b-c CI: [0.057, 0.086]







-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Distance from cutoff (SDs)
linear: 0.077 (0.004)**








-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Distance from cutoff (SDs)
linear: 0.009 (0.002)**
local: 0.006 (0.003)*, b-c CI: [-0.002, 0.012]
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Distance from cutoff (SDs)
linear: 0.015 (0.004)**
local: 0.004 (0.008), b-c CI: [-0.016, 0.019]
Note: Panel (a) shows share receiving any offer in the application year. Panel (b) shows share enrolling
any program in the application year. Panel (c) shows share enrolling any program within 13 years. Panel
(d) shows share who have completed any program within 13 years. See notes to Figure 2 for further
explanations.
Figure 3. Threshold crossing, college enrollment and completion
of ever enrolling or ultimately completing college.
Regression-discontinuity estimates on educational choices
While threshold crossing has ultimately little if any impact on enrollment in higher
education or college completion, Figure 4 reveals that threshold crossing to preferred
program is key for the type of college education that individuals choose and complete.
Also in this figure, we pool all the programs and admission cutoffs, plot the unrestricted
means of the outcomes in bins, and include regression lines on each side of the admission
cutoff.
Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that crossing the threshold increases the probability of
getting an offer for the preferred program by about 46 percentage points. Preferred pro-
gram enrollment increases initially by 27 percentage points (panel b), and ultimately by
26 percentage points (panel c). By comparison, preferred program completion increases
19
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linear: 0.230 (0.005)**
local: 0.178 (0.010)**, b-c CI: [0.152, 0.197]
Note: Panel (a) shows share offered the preferred program in the application year. Panel (b) shows share
enrolling in the preferred program in the application year. Panel (c) shows share enrolling in the preferred
program within 13 years. Panel (d) shows share who have completed the preferred program within 13
years. See notes to Figure 2 for further explanations.
Figure 4. Threshold crossing, type of college education
by 18 percentage points (panel d). Thus, we conclude that threshold crossing impacts
the type of higher education that people enroll in and complete, not whether people
enroll and ultimately complete any college education.
Regression-discontinuity estimates on matching and homogamy
The figures above show that individuals on both sides of the threshold are similar in the
rates of college enrollment and completion, but differ in the program in which they get
an offer, enroll, and ultimately graduate. Figure 5 examines whether the abrupt changes
in program of study at the cutoffs are associated with discontinuous changes in whether
and whom one marries where we focus on the first observed match since applying. As
above, we pool all the fields and admission cutoffs, plot the unrestricted means of the
outcomes in bins, and include regression lines on each side of the admission cutoff.
Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows that crossing the threshold does not change the probabil-
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local: 0.004 (0.003), b-c CI: [-0.004, 0.011]
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Distance from cutoff (SDs)
linear: 0.009 (0.001)**
local: 0.009 (0.003)**, b-c CI: [0.003, 0.015]
Note: Panel (a) shows share with any match 13 years after applying. Panel (b) shows share with part-
ner with college degree. Panel (c) shows share with partner having completed the applicant’s preferred
program. Panel (d) shows share who have completed the preferred program and who have a preferred-
program match. See notes to Figure 2 for further explanations.
Figure 5. Threshold crossing, marriage and homogamy
ity of marriage. Nor does it, as shown in panel (b), change the probability of matching
a college graduate. As evident from panel (c), however, threshold crossing to preferred
program makes it more likely to match with someone who has enrolled in and com-
pleted exactly the same type of education. At the threshold, this probability increases
by nearly 50 percent, from 2 to 3 percentage points. Likewise, crossing the threshold
doubles the chances of a homogamous match where both spouses have completed a
degree in the preferred program (panel d).
The regression-discontinuity estimates show that threshold crossing to preferred
program changes the type of college education that people enroll in and complete, but
it does not affect the probability of enrolling in or completing any type of college. Like-
wise, threshold crossing to preferred program impacts the propensity to match with
someone with a degree in this program. However, it does not affect whether one mar-
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Note: See notes to Figure 2, 4 and 5 for further explanations.
Figure 6. Threshold crossing, field/institution of study and homogamy
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ries or whether one marries a college graduate. Figure 6 examines these findings in
greater detail, breaking down the results for preferred program (defined as the combina-
tion of field and institution) into field versus institution of study. We find that threshold
crossing has a especially large effect on homogamy with respect to institution.
6 Instrumental variables model
The discontinuities that arise from the college admission process allow us to identify
the so-called intention-to-treat effects of crossing the admission thresholds. To estimate
the effect of enrollment we now turn to our instrumental variable estimation, which
uses the admission thresholds as instruments.
Regression model and parameters of interest
Our IVmodel uses threshold crossing as an instrument for enrollment in the applicants’
preferred program. We will estimate the following first-stage
di = πz i + x′iγ + ui (4)
where the dependent variable di equals 1 if the applicant ever enrolled in the preferred
program, field or institution (and zero otherwise). The instrument z i is the predicted
offer for the preferred option, and z i is therefore equal to one if is the individual’s ap-
plication score exceeds the admission cutoff (and zero otherwise).
The corresponding second stage is as follows
yi t = δtdi + x′i βt + ei t (5)
where yi t is the outcome of interest of individual i in year since applying t . The target
of our estimation is the average of δt among the compliers who enroll in their preferred
program because their application score are just above the admission cutoff to this pro-
gram and who would not have enrolled otherwise. We use 2SLS with first and second
stage equations given by (4) and (5) to estimate δt for every year t = 1, 2, . . . , 13. We
also decompose the estimated δt into the complier average potential outcomes with and
without the preferred program. Here we follow Abadie (2003) who shows that with a
binary treatment and instrument d and z , and a scalar outcome y one can recover the
compliers’ mean potential outcome with treatment y1 from a 2SLS regression of d · y
on d instrumented with z . Similarly the compliers’ mean potential outcome with treat-
ment y0 can be recovered from a 2SLS regression of (1− d) · y on (1− d) instrumented
with z . This decomposition helps in interpreting the magnitude of the estimated effects.
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Identifying assumptions
To identify δt , we make three assumptions. The first is that applicants are not able to
perfectly sort themselves around the cutoff in order to receive an offer for their preferred
field of study. As showed in the previous section, the data supports this assumption. The
second assumption is that crossing the admission threshold makes it weakly more likely
that an applicant enrolls in the preferred degree. This monotonicity assumption seems
plausible in our setting.
The last assumption of our IV model is that threshold crossing affects the outcomes
of interest only through the treatment variable. To evaluate this assumption, it is useful
to observe that we specify di as an indicator for whether an applicant enrolls in the
preferred program. This specification alleviates concerns about the exclusion restriction
that could arise of one instead used having completed preferred program as the treatment
variable. If one uses completion as the treatment variable, the concern would be that
individuals who enroll in a given may be more likely to meet and match with other
people in that program, even if they drop out and do not complete the program.
Estimation, empirical specification, and inference
Our estimation approach exploits the fuzzy regression discontinuity design implicit in
the admission process described above, where individuals with application scores above
the cutoff are more likely to receive an offer from the preferred program. Although
the identification in this setup is ultimately local, we use 2SLS because our sample sizes
are too small to perform local non-parametric estimation. We need to include certain
covariates x i to ensure the exogeneity of our instrument. In particular we control for
the running variable. Motivated by the graphical evidence, our baseline specification
includes a linear spline in the applicant’s application score distance to the admission
threshold, thus allowing the slope to vary on each side of the cutoff. To reduce residual
variance we also add a set of (pre-determined) controls for gender, application year, and
preferred program. About 15–20 percent of the applicants are observed at two margins.
To address the dependency this creates between observations we cluster the standard
errors at the applicant level. In Figure 11 we present results from several specification
checks, all of which support our main findings. We discuss these in more detail in the
next section.
Recovering assortativity
As discussed in Section 3, when interpretingmeasures of educational homogamy it is im-
portant to observe that the values they can take on are constrained by the marginal dis-
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tributions of education among men and women. This motivated rescaling homogamy
rates by maximumminus random homogamy ℎm − ℎr . In some comparisons below we
also rescale our 2SLS estimates of the effect of enrollment on homogamy. Given that
our IV estimates are local to the compliers, we will rescale the estimates by the average
scaling factor ℎm − ℎr for treated compliers (i.e. complier y1). It is useful to note here
that assigning another individual to their preferred option will have a negligible effect
of the marginal distribution of potential partners, and therefore have no noticeable ef-
fect on maximum possible homogamy and homogamy under random matching. We
therefore take ℎm and ℎr as fixed measures above and below the cutoff. To compute the
scaling factor we first construct ℎm and ℎr based on applicants’ preferred education (see
the discussion in Section 2.3), and then estimate the average for compliers by estimating
2SLS regressions as in (5), but with di · (ℎm − ℎr ) as a dependent variable.
7 College education, homogamy and assortativity
We now present the IV estimates of how the choice of college education affects ho-
mogamy and assortativity. We focus on the second-stage estimates. The first-stage esti-
mates are reported in the notes to the figures. F-statistics are never below 2000, suggest-
ing that weak instruments are not a cause of concern.
Effects on homogamy and assortativity with respect to program
Figure 7 reports 2SLS estimates of equations (4) and (5) of the effects of enrolling in
the preferred program. We consider two outcome variables. The first is an indicator
variable for the applicant matching with someone who holds a degree in the applicant’s
preferred program. The second is an indicator variable for homogamy with respect to
program, that is: both the applicant and the spouse have a degree in the applicant’s
preferred program. The effects on these two outcome variables can differ only because
some applicants may first enroll and then drop out of the preferred program. When
interpreting how the estimates change over time, it is useful to observe that the educa-
tion of the spouse is recorded 13 years after application. As a result, any variation in
matching effects over time is due to changes in matching, not changes in the spouse’s
education.
The results in panel (a) show that enrolling in the preferred program causes a large
increase in the probability of matching with someone with a degree in this program.
The effects increase over time, plateauing at nearly 2.5 percentage points by year ten.
Similarly, enrolling in the preferred program increases the program homogamy rate by
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Note: Figure (a) shows 2SLS effects of enrolling in the preferred program, cf. (5), on i) Matching a
preferred-program partner and ii) preferred-program Homogamy, i.e. completed preferred program and
preferred-program partner. Each estimate comes from a separate regression among applicants at the pro-
gram margin. Figure (b) shows corresponding effects on effects on preferred-program assortativity, i.e.
the effects on preferred-program matching/homogamy rescaled by mean assortativity for treated compli-
ers. The first-stage coefficient is 0.38 (0.004). Error bars indicate 95% CI (standard errors clustered at the
applicant level).
Figure 7. IV estimates of the effect of enrollment on program homogamy and
assortativity
average program homogamy rate of 0.04. Since the estimated effects on homogamy are
nearly identical to those for matching with someone with a degree in the program, we
focus, in the remainder of the paper, on the homogamy estimates, which are easier to
interpret.
While Panel (a) reports effects on homogamy, panel (b) focuses on the impacts on
assortativity. As explained in Section 6, the latter scales the effects relative to the average
maximum feasible homogamy for the compliers. As evident from panel (b), the effect
on assortativity is considerably larger than the effect on homogamy. By year ten, we
find that enrolling in the preferred program increases assortativity by about 6 percentage
points. This finding highlights the importance of distinguishing between homogamy
and assortativity. The latter is arguably a preferred measure of the degree of sorting,
as it takes into account that the maximal attainable homogamy is constrained by the
marginal education distributions of men and women.
In Figure 8, we estimate the 2SLS model separately by gender. The point estimates
for homogamy are larger formen thanwomen, although the difference is not statistically
significant. However, women are overrepresented relative to men in higher education,
especially in programs like teaching and nursing, which constrains the maximal attain-
able homogamy. After taking this into account through the measure of assortativity
the effects on women become significantly larger for women as compared to men. For
example, the point estimates at 13 years shows that enrolling in the preferred program
26
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Note: Figure (a) shows 2SLS effects of enrolling in the preferred program, cf. (5), on preferred-program
homogamy by applicant’s sex. Sample sizes range from 50,685 to 49,559men and 83,918 to 82,647women.
Figure (b) shows corresponding effects on effects on preferred-program assortativity, i.e. the effects on
preferred-program matching/homogamy rescaled by mean assortativity for treated compliers. The first-
stage coefficient is 0.31 (0.006) for males and 0.41 (0.005) for females . For more details, see note to Figure
7.
Figure 8. IV estimates of the effect of enrollment on program homogamy and
assortativity by gender
increases assortativity among women by as much as 8 percentage points compared to 4
percentage points for men.
Effects on homogamy and assortativity with respect to field and institution
Until now we considered homogamy with respect to the applicant’s preferred program.
A program is defined as a specific field of study at a given institution. We can also
consider homogamywith respect to fields or institutions. This is done in Figure 9 which
shows separate effects on homogamy and assortativity by preferred program, field and
institution.
We find that enrolling in the preferred institution has large effects on the probabil-
ity of homogamy with respect to that same institution. By year ten, enrolling in the
preferred institution increases the homogamy with respect to that institution by 9 per-
centage points. This is a substantial effect on educational homogamy given the average
institution homogamy rate of 0.12. By comparison, the effects on homogamy with re-
spect to field are smaller. By year ten, enrolling in the preferred field has increased the
homogamy with respect to that field by about 4 percentage points. When interpreting
these estimates, however, it is important to observe that the educational distribution
of men and women differ less across institutions than across fields and programs. To
adjust for this, we also present estimates on the degree of assortativity. These effects
are uniformly larger than the effects on homogamy, ranging from about 7 percentage
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Note: Figure (a) shows 2SLS effects of enrolling in the preferred program, field or institution on preferred-
program, field or institution homogamy. Samples are applicants at the margins corresponding to the
different measures of homogamy. Sample sizes range from 132,206 to 134,603 applicants at the program
margin, from 113,148 to 115,119 at the field margin and from 111,757 to 113,810 at the institutionmargin.
Figure (b) shows corresponding effects on assortativity. The first-stage coefficient is 0.38 (0.004) at the
program margin, 0.27 (0.004) at the field margin, and 0.34 (0.004) at the institution margin. For more
details, see note to Figure 7.
Figure 9. IV estimates of the effect of enrollment on homogamy and assortativity by
program, field of study and institution
points for programs to 15 percentage points for institutions. This finding shows that the
homogamy effects with respect to institution remain larger than those for program and
field, even if the effect sizes are measured relative to the maximal attainable homogamy.
Heterogeneity across fields and institutions
Above we documented that the choices of post-secondary education are empirically im-
portant in explaining whom but not whether one marries while addressing concerns
about self-selection into education based on unobservables. Indeed, the magnitude of
these estimates are sufficiently large to explain a majority of the strong educational ho-
mogamy and assortativity that we observe among the college educated in our data. A
natural question to ask is whether these effects of enrollment on homogamy and assor-
tativity are concentrated in certain fields and institutions, or if they apply more broadly.




δkdki + x′i β + ei (6)
where yi denotes preferred field/institution homogamy (measured 13 years after ap-
plying), and the indicator variables dki are equal one if applicant i ever enrolled in
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πkl z l i + x′iγk + uki (7)
where the instruments z l i are equal to one if individual i applied to a program in
field/institution k and also had an application score that exceeded the admission cutoff
in that program. The control variables in x i consist of indicator variables for application
year, sex and preferred program as well as a linear spline in distance to the application
threshold which is allowed to vary across field/institution. Programs are here classified
into ten broad fields following Kirkeboen et al. (2016), and we consider the nine largest
institutions and a pooled tenth group of the remaining smaller ones. Figure 10 summa-
rizes the findings while the detailed estimation results are reported in Appendix Tables
A1 and A2.
The left panel of Figure 10 shows that estimates of enrollment effects on preferred-
field homogamy range from about 2 percentage points in the Humanities to about 13
percentage points in Law. While the effects are fairly similar across many fields of study,
two fields appear to stand out and those are Medicine and Law where enrollment in-
creases homogamy by 8 and 13 percentage points respectively. The gender composition
of students differs however notably across fields. For example, Engineering, Science, and
Technology are fields where the large majority of the students is male, while Health and
Teaching are female dominated fields. To take this into account, Figure 10 also reports
effects of enrollment on assortativity. While we see that accounting for differences in
gender composition does matter for fields such as Health and Engineering, it does not
attenuate differences across fields.
The right panel in Figure 10 reports estimates broken down at the institution level.
The estimates suggest that the enrollment effects on preferred-field homogamy vary
substantially across institutions. Effects on assortativity are uniformly larger as the
majority of students is female, but taking the gender composition into account does
not change the relative order of the effects.
Our results suggest that while differences in gender composition matter for match-
ing, it cannot explain why we observe different effects of enrollment on homogamy
across both fields and institutions. Are the enrollments effects larger for more selective
fields and institutions? And are they larger when earnings are higher? In Appendix
Table A1 we also report average GPA – a measure of selectivity – and earnings across
the different fields and institutions. Average earnings differ by nearly a factor two when
going from the lowest ranked to highest ranked field and institution. We also observe
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Figure 10. Effect of enrollment on homogamy and assortativity – By preferred
field-of-study and institution
Note: These figures show 2SLS effects of enrolling in a given preferred-field (Figure a) or institution
(Figure b) on preferred-field or institution homogamy or assortativity. Samples are applicants at the
margins corresponding to the different measures of homogamy. Sample size is 111,397 at the field margin
and 110,507 at the institution margin. The first-stage coefficients are reported in Appendix Tables A1 and
A2. For more details, see note to Figure 7.
tutions. When we relate these measures with the enrollment effects we uncover corre-
lations in the neighborhood of 0.5 both at the institution and field margin, and these
correlations are unchanged when we account for differences in gender composition.
Thus, we may conclude that the effects of enrollment on educational homogamy and
assortativity vary systematically across fields and institutions, and tend to be larger in
more selective and higher paying fields and institutions.
Specification checks
In Figure 11, we present results from a battery of specification checks. For brevity, we
only report second stage estimates for outcomes measured in the last year of our data,
13 years after applying.
In each graph of Figure 11, the top line reports our baseline estimate, corresponding
to those presented in Figure 9. In the first two specification checks, we show that our
estimates are robust to choice of bandwidth and do not materially change if we change
the bandwidth in the regression discontinuity estimation. In the next three specifica-
tion checks we show that our estimates are robust to adding more controls, including
indicator variables for next-best program, quadratic splines in the distance to the cut-off,
and additional pre-determined variables for applicant and family background (includ-
ing dummies for age at application, municipality of residence at age 16 and dummies
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































our sample are observed at observed at two margins (see the discussion in Section 2),
we include a specification check where we only keep the most-preferred margin of each
applicant. Reassuringly, the estimates do not materially change. One issue, which is
particularly relevant for the interpretation of the institution effects, is whether the treat-
ment is confounded by geography. To investigate this question the last rows in Figure
11 restrict the sample to applicants who are on the margin between program, fields or
institutions within the same municipality. This ensures that the reported effects only
capture the consequences of within municipality assignments and the results show that
we can rule out that (changes in) locality explain our results.
8 What determines homogamy among the college educated?
Above, we documented that the choices of college education are important determinant
of educational homogamy and assortativity. Motivated by this finding, we now examine
the ways in which this educational homogamy and assortativity arise.
Our point of departure is the textbook models of marriage markets where educa-
tional homogamy and assortativity arise as equilibrium outcomes of preferences for
spousal education given the marginal distributions of education of men and women
(see e.g. Choo and Siow, 2006; Chiappori et al., 2017).10 However, these models rely
on assumptions that may not hold in practice. One issue is that individuals may match
on traits correlated with education, and not (only) education per se. These traits may
be unobserved to the econometrician, such as innate ability or tastes.11 Another issue
is the assumption of a large and frictionless market. In reality, search frictions are likely
to depend on educational choices, as it is easier to meet people with the same educa-
tion, both while in school and later at work. The goal of our analysis is to address and
investigate these issues while considering the question of why college graduates tend to
marry spouses with the same type of education.
10The literature discusses two types of preferences. One possibility is that individuals have horizontal
preferences for same-education spouses. For example, doctors may have preferences for matching with
doctors and lawyers may have preferences for matching with lawyers. The result of such preferences
may be that both lawyers and doctors tend to marry spouses with the same type of education. Another
possibility is that individuals have vertical preferences across education types, giving a uniform ranking
of spouses with ranks monotonically related to the spouse’s education. For example, both lawyers and
doctors may prefer to marry doctors. Yet, in equilibrium, homogamy may arise as doctors are more
attractive in the marriage market as compared to lawyers.
11See Chiappori et al. (2018) for a model of the marriage market where individuals match on human
capital, which depends on education but also on innate ability. They allow the latter to be unobserved to
the econometrician, and usewage and labor supply dynamics to recover the joint distribution of education
and ability and therefore of human capital.
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Table 5. Comparison of homogamy rates
Observed Random Complier Effect of
homogamy homogamy Y 0 enrollment
Preferred
- Program 0.046 0.003 0.011 (0.001) 0.023 (0.004)
- Field 0.062 0.014 0.028 (0.003) 0.027 (0.008)
- Institution 0.121 0.017 0.036 (0.003) 0.080 (0.008)
Note: Observedmatching is average program, field or institution homogamy rates in the sample (see Table
4). Random matching is constructed by randomly assigning partners given the population of potential
partners for each gender and application year. Complier Y 0 is the estimated level of preferred-education
matching for untreated compliers, while effect of enrollment is the 2SLS estimate of the effect of enrolling.
Standard errors in parentheses.
8.1 Importance of traits determined prior to enrollment
The discontinuities that arise from the admission process allow us to eliminate any cor-
relation between educational choices and pre-determined unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences, ability, and other factors. This implies that our finding of large impacts
on homogamy and assortativity reflect the educational choices that individuals make,
and not their pre-determined traits. However, this does not imply that predetermined
factors do not matter for the educational homogamy and assortativity we observe in the
data. To shed light on the potential importance of such pre-determined traits, we esti-
mate the potential homogamy of the compliers to our instrument if they did not enroll
in the preferred program (i.e. the complier mean potential outcome without treatment
y0, as described in Section 6).
Table 5 reports random matching rates and the effect of enrollment on different
types of homogamy (preferred program, field and institution). For reference the first
two columns repeat the average and random homogamy rates from Table 4.The third
column reports the counterfactual level of matching y0 that we would have observed for
the compliers if they would not have enrolled in their preferred program option. This
counterfactual level of matching reflects the role of ex-ante traits of the individuals.
The fact that counterfactual levels of matching are relatively close to random levels of
matching indicates that pre-determined traits play a modest role in explaining observed
homogamy rates. By comparison, the magnitude of the enrollment effects in the final
column suggests that educational choices per se can explain nearly all the educational
homogamy and assortativity among the college educated (at least among the compliers).
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8.2 What are the key determinants of educational homogamy?
The results above showed that enrollment can account for a large share of educational
assortativity among the college educated. But what are the mechanisms? To help under-
stand the determinants of educational homogamy, we now perform a series of decom-
positions. These decompositions reveal the following: a) the effect of enrollment on
homogamy with respect to field is completely explained by within-institution matches;
b) with respect to institution one third of the effect of enrollment on homogamy is ex-
plained by matches that are specific to the field of study, while the remainder are across-
field matches; c) nearly all the effect of enrollment on homogamy is explained by within
cohort matches; d) only a small part of the effect of enrollment on homogamy can be
explained by matches that happens within the same workplace. Taken together, these
results suggests that colleges are effectively local marriage markets, mattering greatly
for whom one marries, not because of the pre-determined traits of the students that are
admitted but as a direct result of attending a particular institution at a given time.
Institution and field of study Matches that are homogamous with respect to field (F )
are either field-homogamous at the institution level (F × I ) or field-homogamous across
institutions (F ×!I ),
Pr(F ) = Pr(F × I ) + Pr(F ×!I ).
By estimating the effects of enrollment on each component of this identity, we can
decompose the effect on field-homogamous matching into an effect on matching on
institution within the same field and an effect on matching on institutions across fields.
The left panel of Figure 12 reports the results. We find that the effect of enrollment on
homogamy by field is completely explained by within-institution matches.
By the same argument, we can take advantage of the identity that homogamous
matches with respect to institution are either institution-homogamous at the field level
(F × I ) or institution-homogamous across fields (F ×!I ),
Pr(I ) = Pr(I × F ) + Pr(I×!F ),
and perform a similar decomposition of the effect of education on institution-homogamous
matching into the effect matching on fields within the same institution and an effect on
matching on fields across institutions. These results are reported in the right panel of
Figure 12. We find that about one third of the effect of enrollment on homogamy by in-
stitution is explained by within-field matches, while the remainder is due to across-field
matches.
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Note: Figure (a) decomposes the 2SLS effect of enrollment on preferred-field homogamy (F ) into ef-
fects on matching field and institution (F&I ) and effects on matching field but not matching institution
(F&!I ). Figure (b) similarly decomposes the effect of enrollment on preferred-institution homogamy ( I )
into effect on same-field institution homogamy ( I&F ) and not-same-field institution homogamy ( I&!F ).
Error bars indicate 95% CI (standard errors clustered at the applicant level).
Figure 12. Decomposing the effect of enrollment on homogamy by field of study (F )
and institution ( I )
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Note: Figure (a) decomposes the 2SLS effect of enrollment on preferred-field homogamy (F ) into effects
on field-homogamy and cohort (same time of enrollment) (F&T ) and effects on field homogamy but
different cohort (F&!T ). Figure (b) similarly decomposes preferred-institution homogamy ( I ). Error
bars indicate 95% CI (standard errors clustered at the applicant level).
Figure 13. Decomposing the effect of enrollment on homogamy (F , I ) by cohort (T )
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Note: Figure (a) decomposes the 2SLS effect of enrollment on preferred-field homogamy (F ) into effects
on field homogamy and overlapping employment history (F&E ) and effects on field-homogamy but
never same employers at the same time (F&!E ). Figure (b) decomposes preferred-institution homogamy
( I ). Error bars indicate 95% CI (standard errors clustered at the applicant level).
Figure 14. Decomposing the effect of enrollment on homogamy (F , I ) by
employer-homogamy (E )
Time of enrollment Most programs in Norwegian post-secondary education consist of
mandatory and elective courses, where the mandatory courses are usually taken with
students from the same cohort. We therefore expect that students are more likely to
meet potential partners from their own cohort than from other cohorts. To further
develop this notion, we take advantage of the identity that that homogamous matches
with respect to institution are either homogamous with respect to enrollment in the
same application year (T ) or not (!T ):
Pr(I ) = Pr(I ×T ) + Pr(I×!T ).
By estimating the effects of enrollment on the components of this identity, we can de-
compose the effect on institution-homogamous matching into an effect on matching
on institution within the same cohort and an effect on matching on institutions across
cohorts. A similar decomposition follows for field-of-study (F ). Figure 13 reports the
results. We find that nearly all the effect of enrollment on homogamy is explained by
within cohort matches. Not only do colleges act as marriagemarkets, but search appears
also to be local within institutions.
Workplace While educational choices matter for whom you meet in college, they may
also affect matching after graduation through work. Thanks to our employer-employee
data, we can not only track people through the education system, but also into the labor
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force and more specifically across firms. We can therefore see whether individuals who
match have overlapped at the same employer (before we observe the match and within
13 years since applying). Taking advantage of this data, we can compute the components
of the identity that that homogamous matches with respect to institution (or field) are
either homogamous with respect to having had the same employer (E ) or not (!E ):
Pr(F ) = Pr(F × E) + Pr(F ×!E)
By estimating the effects of enrollment on the components of this identity, we can de-
compose the effect on institution or field homogamous matching into an effect within
the same employer and an effect on matching on institutions across employers. Fig-
ure 14 reports the results from this decomposition. The results suggest that only a small
part of the effect of enrollment on educational homogamy can be attributed to matches
within the same workplace.
8.3 Matching functions and market size and tightness
Above, we documented that colleges are effectively local marriage markets and key de-
terminants of educational homogamy among the college educated. The effects on edu-
cational choices on homogamy are local to institution, and having overlapped at college.
These findings seem at odds with frictionless matching models where it is typically as-
sumed that each person has free access to the pool of all potential partners, with perfect
knowledge of the characteristics of each of them—and vice versa. This assumption leads
matching models to disregard the cost of acquiring information about potential matches
as well as the role of meeting technologies. In contrast, frictions are paramount in search
models of the marriage market. In these models, each individual is typically assumed
to sequentially meet one person of the opposite gender; after such a meeting, both in-
dividuals must decide whether to settle for the current mate or continue searching. To
summarize and quantify this complicated search process in terms of a few variables,
matching functions have proven useful (see e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Build-
ing on Barnichon and Figura (2015), we specify and estimate market-specific matching
functions that helps investigate the impact of local market tightness and size on educa-
tional homogamy.
Empirical model We allow the marriage market to be segmented in submarkets, where
each submarket k is described by a measure of market size (number of students), and a
measure of market tightness (sex ratio). Given that our interest in colleges as marriage
markets, we consider three alternative specifications of these submarkets: programs,
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fields or institutions. In each specification, we empirically model the probability of a
preferred-education homogamous match (yi = 1) as depending on enrollment decision
and the size and tightness of the market
yi = δdi + α1di log ri + α2di log ni
+ α3(1 − di) log ri + α4(1 − di) log ni + x′iφ + ui t (8)
where di equals one if i enrolls in her preferred program (field or institution), log ri is
the log of the sex-ratio (# own sex / # other sex) in the program (field or institution)
enrolled, and log ni is the log of the size (# other sex) of the program (field or institu-
tion). We compute ri and ni for each combination of education type (program, field or
institution), enrollment year, and gender. The regression model is estimated separately
by gender, allowing each coefficient to vary freely across men and women.
When estimating (8), we address concerns about selection and correlated unobserv-
ables by using the predicted offer for the preferred option as an instrument. The pre-
dicted offer instrument for di is equal to one if is the individual’s application score
exceeds the admission cutoff (and zero otherwise). Depending on whether the individ-
ual’s score is higher (lower) than the admission cutoff, the individual is also predicted to
be exposed to the peers in the preferred program (field or institution). This allows us to
instrument the size and sex ratio of the program (field or institution) with the predicted
size and sex ratio of the program (field or institution). In both the first and the second
stages, we control for the running variable by including a linear spline in the applicant’s
application score distance to the admission threshold, thus allowing the slope to vary on
each side of the cutoff. We also add controls for gender, application year, and preferred
and next-best program. Given these controls, we are identified from temporal variation
in (predicted) size and sex ratios within each program (field or institution).
Empirical results Table 6 reports the IV estimates of equation (8) separately by gen-
der. The tests of the rank condition reported in the table show that weak instruments
are of little if any concern. As evident from Table 6, enrollment in the preferred pro-
gram – evaluated at the average program size and sex-ratio in the sample – increases
the likelihood of a homogeneous match by 3 percentage points for men and about 4
percentage points for women, which is in line with our estimates in Section 7. Both
for men and women we find that the tighter the market (a higher sex-ratio ri ) in the
preferred program, the lower the likelihood of a homogamous match. There is, how-
ever, no indication that the size (ni ) of the preferred program matters significantly for
matching.
The estimates for institution and field homogamy are broadly consistent with those
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Table 6. IV estimates of effects of enrollment on program/field/institution homogamy
by sex-ratio and size of the program/field/institution
Women Men
Program Field Inst Program Field Inst
di 0.046 0.065 0.056 0.036 0.080 0.085
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
di · log ri -0.015 -0.039 -0.030 -0.010 -0.025 0.046
(0.005) (0.014) (0.023) (0.006) (0.008) (0.020)
di · log ni 0.003 -0.004 0.020 0.004 -0.020 0.036
(0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
(1 − di) · log ri 0.005 0.023 0.010 0.001 0.012 0.033
(0.004) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.024)
(1 − di) · log ni -0.003 0.003 -0.007 0.004 0.012 -0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Mean dep. var. 0.016 0.028 0.052 0.026 0.040 0.075
Rank test ( χ21 ) 150.1 32.6 179.5 96.7 18.5 87.5
N 53,568 39,660 41,732 28,901 22,629 22,651
Note: Ri = Sex-ratio = # own sex /# other sex. The reported rank test is the LM version of the Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) r k LM-statistic. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
at the program level. Enrolling in the preferred institution or field has a large impact
on the likelihood of a homogamy on that margin. While more market tightness also
reduces the likelihood of an preferred institution and field homogamous match, there
appear to be increasing returns to scale at the institution level. For institution and field
homogamy, we also find that market tightness in the alternative, next-best education
matters for homogamy. To see this, note that a positive coefficient on (1 − di) · log ri
means that individuals are more likely to marry someone in the preferred education if
there are relatively few students of the opposite sex in the next-best education in which
they enrolled.
Although the enrollment effects in Table 6 are larger for men than for women, we
cannot reject that they are equal. This is also true if we evaluate them at a sex-ratio of
0.5 and the average program size of 200. Furthermore, we cannot reject that the effects
of market tightness and market size are also similar across gender.
9 Conclusion
How does the choice of college education affect whether and whom one marries? Why
are college graduates so likely to marry someone within their own institution or field
of study? We answered these questions using administrative data for Norway’s post-
secondary education system. A centralized admission process created instruments for
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choice of college education from discontinuities that effectively randomize applicants
near unpredictable admission cutoffs into different institutions and fields of study. Thus,
differences in marriage market outcomes across these applicants are due to the institu-
tion or field to which they are exogenously assigned, as opposed to their pre-existing
abilities, preferences, or family background.
Our instrumental variables estimates are summarized with six broad conclusions.
First, the choices of post-secondary education are empirically important in explaining
whom but not whether one marries. Indeed, the magnitude of these estimates are suffi-
ciently large to explain amajority of the strong educational homogamy and assortativity
that we observe among the college educated in our data. Second, enrolling in a particular
institution makes it much more likely to marry someone from that institution. These
effects are especially large if individuals overlapped in college, and they are sizable even
if the spouse studied a different field. Third, enrolling in a particular field increases the
chances of marrying someone within the field insofar the individuals attended the same
institution. By contrast, enrolling in a field makes it no more likely to marry someone
from other institutions with the same field. Fourth, the effects of enrollment on edu-
cational homogamy and assortativity vary systematically across fields and institutions,
and tend to larger in more selective and higher paying fields and institutions. Fifth, only
a small part of the effect of enrollment on educational homogamy can be attributed to
matches within the same workplace. Lastly, the effects on the probability of marrying
someone within their institution and field vary systematically with cohort-to-cohort
variation in sex ratios within institutions and fields. This finding is at odds with the
assumption in canonical matching models with large and frictionless marriage markets.
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Table A1. 2SLS homogamy effects, complier shares, contribution to total effect on
preferred-field homogamy and assortativity effects by preferred field; average GPA, earn-
ings and homogamy by completed field
Enroll First Complier Effect Averages by Field
Effect stage Share Share Assort. GPA Earnings Homog.
Science 0.027 0.224 0.051 0.034 0.056 0.196 0.534 0.069
(0.020) (0.019)
Engineering 0.047 0.214 0.011 0.013 0.141 0.126 0.635 0.050
(0.043) (0.038)
Commerce 0.043 0.148 0.073 0.076 0.047 0.064 0.586 0.118
(0.038) (0.012)
Soc. Science 0.042 0.239 0.080 0.081 0.055 0.312 0.459 0.076
(0.017) (0.015)
Teaching 0.035 0.271 0.128 0.110 0.067 -0.226 0.410 0.051
(0.013) (0.012)
Humanities 0.017 0.198 0.052 0.022 0.024 0.199 0.381 0.100
(0.026) (0.017)
Health 0.031 0.348 0.454 0.347 0.110 -0.169 0.413 0.040
(0.006) (0.007)
Technology 0.038 0.212 0.049 0.045 0.089 0.690 0.713 0.145
(0.048) (0.020)
Law 0.131 0.229 0.057 0.183 0.172 0.449 0.625 0.148
(0.036) (0.018)




Note: 2SLS estimates of the effect of enrollment on preferred-field-of-study homogamy by field-of-study
cf. the specifications outlined in section 7. Complier shares are (relative) sample size weighted first-
stage coefficients. Effect shares indicate corresponding relative contributions of the preferred-field-specific
effects to the total effect. Assortativity refers to estimates rescaled by the average scaling factor ℎm − ℎr
for treated compliers (i.e. complier y1 ) cf. section 6. GPA is standardized in the sample, Earnings are in
100K NOK and measured 13 years after applying. Homogamy refers to observed-field homogamy in the
sample. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table A2. 2SLS homogamy effects, complier shares, contribution to total effect on
preferred-institution homogamy and assortativity effects by preferred institution; aver-
age GPA, earnings and homogamy by completed institution
Enroll First Complier Effect Averages by Institution
Effect stage Share Share Assort. GPA Earnings Homog.
HiA 0.158 0.276 0.042 0.069 0.200 -0.112 0.457 0.202
(0.035) (0.020)
HiB 0.091 0.360 0.079 0.074 0.143 0.089 0.464 0.140
(0.021) (0.016)
HiO 0.050 0.384 0.171 0.088 0.094 0.109 0.444 0.080
(0.010) (0.011)
HiS 0.098 0.365 0.073 0.075 0.148 0.026 0.508 0.187
(0.022) (0.016)
HiST 0.117 0.385 0.108 0.131 0.154 0.100 0.470 0.153
(0.019) (0.014)
NHH 0.091 0.282 0.038 0.036 0.102 0.759 0.808 0.147
(0.040) (0.021)
NTNU 0.253 0.231 0.046 0.120 0.324 0.594 0.612 0.275
(0.056) (0.018)
UiB 0.144 0.342 0.046 0.068 0.176 0.480 0.530 0.227
(0.031) (0.020)
UiO 0.118 0.229 0.069 0.084 0.161 0.517 0.509 0.202
(0.035) (0.014)




Note: 2SLS estimates of the effect of enrollment on preferred-institution homogamy by institution cf.
the specifications outlined in section 7. Complier shares are (relative) sample size weighted first-stage co-
efficients. Effect shares indicate corresponding relative contributions of the preferred-institution-specific
effects to the total effect. Assortativity refers to estimates rescaled by the average scaling factor ℎm − ℎr
for treated compliers (i.e. complier y1 ) cf. section 6. GPA is standardized in the sample, Earnings are in
100K NOK and measured 13 years after applying. Homogamy refers to observed-institution homogamy
in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
46
